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I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation is a key to contemporary real estate financing. One of
those innovations centers around the increased interest in equity partic-
ipations' by mortgage oriented Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).2
The reasons for this type of innovation are varied but result primarily
from inflationary trends, risk factors and the novelty of the project or
security for the investment. These factors lead to a desire on the part of
REITs to obtain a somewhat more contingent return on their investments
which will insure the desired yield.
This article will discuss some of the legal and business aspects of
negotiating and structuring equity kickers with emphasis upon compliance
with the provisions of sections 856-58 of the Internal Revenue Code3 and
* Member of the Florida Bar; Partner, Swann & Glass, Coral Gables, Florida. The
author acknowledges the assistance of Rodney W. Bryson, Editorial Board Member, Uni-
versity of Miami Law Review.
1. There does not appear to be a uniform definition of these interests nor are they
called the same thing by persons within the real estate industry. They are sometimes re-
ferred to as equity participations, equity kickers, equity sweeteners, etc. For a REIT, the
use of the word "equity" is unfortunate in light of the stringent income and activity tests
with which it must comply. A better description might be contingent interest or contingent
rental. However, for ease of recognition, the type of interest discussed will hereinafter gen-
erally be referred to as an equity kicker.
2. Although there are many variations of REITs, they generally fall into three types:
(a) equity trusts which invest in equity interests in real property and derive most of their
income from rentals; (b) mortgage trusts which invest in mortgages on real property and
derive most of their income from interest; and (c) combination or mixed trusts which en-
gage in both types of investment. Unless the context indicates otherwise, this article will
concentrate on the structuring and use of equity kickers by mortgage oriented trusts. The
terms REIT and trust are used interchangeably herein. For a general discussion of equity
trusts, see Rabinowitz, Real Estate Investment Trusts: Tax Problems of Equity Trusts,
N.Y.U. 31ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1773 (1973).
3. All reference hereinafter to the Internal Revenue Code or the Code will be to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
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the applicable treasury regulations. In addition, specific types of equity
kickers will be discussed with some of the business and legal problems
each presents.
Several caveats are in order. Extreme care must be exercised in apply-
ing general statements regarding a particular type of equity kicker to a
specific transaction. Since all relevant facts must be considered in reach-
ing a given conclusion and these facts change from transaction to transac-
tion, it must not be assumed in all cases that a particular type of equity
kicker will be treated identically. This article will hopefully demonstrate
that too simplistic an approach to a REIT's use of equity kickers can
cause serious problems which result from the failure to comply with the
stringent rules under which REITs operate.
Secondly, the authority for many of the conclusions and opinions
herein is based on private rulings of the Internal Revenue Service,4 com-
mentaries and articles in this area, plus seemingly analogous revenue
rulings and decisions in other areas of the tax law. Few guidelines are
given by the regulations and published rulings in this area. It is important,
therefore, to be conservative when negotiating and structuring equity
kickers, balancing in all cases, the desire to obtain the best business
arrangement for the trust without assuming- an unacceptable level of
business risk.
Thus, it might be said that the primary goals of a REIT in negotiat-
ing and structuring an equity kicker are: (a) to increase the yield on the
mortgage investment to a level which accurately represents the risks, as
well as to capitalize on the growth features of real estate and real estate
oriented borrowers; (b) to obtain the type of equity kicker most likely
to achieve these goals; and (c) to insure that the equity kicker will
comply with the income, assets and passivity requirements of the Code,
as well as with state law.
II. REIT OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. Current Regulations
REITs provide the small investor with the opportunity to pool his
money in large real estate ventures and to achieve wide diversification
and concomitantly reduced risk.
This secures for the trust beneficiaries the same type of tax
treatment they would receive if they held the real estate equities
and mortgages directly and, therefore, equates their treatment
with that accorded investors in regulated investment companies.
[I]n both cases the methods of interest constitute pooling
arrangements whereby small investors can secure advantages
4. Private rulings are based on specific transactions and it is risky to generalize from
one fact pattern to another unless they are identical. In addition, only the taxpayer who
received the ruling is entitled to rely thereon.
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normally available only to those with larger resources. These ad-
vantages reward spreading the risk of loss by the greater di-
versification of investment which can be secured through the
pooling arrangement; the opportunity to secure the benefits of
expert investment counsel; and the means of collectively financ-
ing projects which investors could not undertake singly ...
Your Committee believes it is also desirable to remove taxation
to the extent possible as a factor in determining the relative size
of investment in stock and securities on the one hand and real
estate equities on the other.5
To the extent that the REIT meets certain stringent requirements,
the small investor receives the same tax treatment as if he held real estate
equities or mortgages directly. Thus, he receives treatment similar to that
accorded investors in regulated investment companies.6
Congress intended to use the REIT as an entity to draw small in-
vestors' capital into the real estate development market.7 The REIT was
not created to afford small investors an opportunity to compete with those
who actively develop real estate. Hence, Congress demanded that REITs
remain completely passive in nature,8 and not hold any property for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
The management of a REIT's affairs is by one or more trustees.9
The entity must be so constituted otherwise as to be taxed as a domestic
corporation.'0 Beneficial ownership is evidenced by transferable shares
of beneficial interest which must be held by 100 or more persons during
at least 335 days of a full taxable year, or during a proportionate part of
a short taxable year." Through these requirements, the REIT brings its
investors together in a business venture, divides the income, and has con-
tinuity of life, centralized management, limited liability and transfer-
ability of interest.
While the above requirements are relatively easily satisfied, the
Internal Revenue Code imposes certain income and asset requirements
upon REITs that are not so easily met. At least 75% of a REIT's gross
income must be derived from rents from real property, interest on obliga-
5. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1960). See Comment, The Real Es-
tate Investment Trust: Legal and Economic Aspects, 24 U. MIAmi L. REV. 155 (1969).
6. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1960). See Comment, The Real Es-
tate Investment Trust: Legal and Economic Aspects, 24 U. MIAmi L. REV. 155 (1969).
7. Post & King, Final REIT Regulations Adopted; The Changes and the Effects, 17 J.
TAX. 54 (1962); see Dockser, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Old Business Form Re-
vitalized, 17 U. MiAmt L. REv. 115 (1962).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(4) (1962) as
amended by T.D. 6928 (1967).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) (1962) as
amended by T.D. 6928 (1967).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b) (3) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6928 (1967).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(5) (1962) as
amended by T.D. 6928 (1967). At no time may fewer than five individuals own more than
50% in value of a REIT's outstanding shares. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(6); Treas.
Reg. § 1.856-1(d) (5) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6928 (1967).
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tions secured by mortgages on real property, gain from the sale of such
interests, gain or dividends from interests held in other REITs, and re-
funds from realty taxes.12 An additional 15% of gross income must be
derived from the foregoing sources, interest irrespective of source, gains
from the sales of securities or dividends. 3 Less than 30% of annual gross
income may be derived from sale or disposition of stock held for less than
six months or real property (including interests therein) held for less than
four years.'
4
A minimum of 75% of the value of the REIT's total assets must be
represented by real estate assets, cash, cash items and government securi-
ties.'" No more than 25% of the value of a REIT's total assets may be
represented by securities other than government securities.'" Further, no
more than 5% of the value of a REIT's total assets may be invested in
securities of any one issuer, and not more than 10% of any issuer's out-
standing voting securities may be acquired.'7
If the above guidelines are met, and if a minimum of 90% of the
REIT's taxable income is distributed as dividends to shareholders, 8 the
REIT is said to "qualify" under sections 856-58 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The principal benefit of qualification is that the REIT pays no
federal tax on income properly distributed to its shareholders. 9 How-
ever, if the REIT fails to qualify, a major liquidity crisis could result. A
disqualified entity is not entitled to a deduction for dividends paid to its
shareholders, regardless of the amount actually distributed in good faith.
It is taxed as a domestic corporation 0 Since most REITs pay quarterly
dividends throughout the year and rely upon the dividend deduction in
tax planning, failure to qualify could bring disastrous results.2 '
Many equity participations negotiated by REITs relate directly to
one of the asset or income requirements of the Code. Often the deleterious
impact of a participation is not apparent until an infringement of the regu-
lations has become difficult or impossible to avoid. Particular problems
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c) (1) (ii) (1962).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2 (c) (1) (i) (1962).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (4) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c) (1) (iii) (1962).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (5) (A); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d) (1) (1962).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d)(2) (1962).
Government securities by definition include securities of the Federal Home Loan Bank,
the Federal Land Bank, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Banks for Cooperatives and
the Public Housing Administration. Rev. Rul. 64-85, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 230.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (5) (B); Treas. Regs. § 1.856-2(d) (2) (1962).
18. IN T. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-1(a) (1962). The trust
must affirmatively elect to be taxed as a REIT. See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(b) (1962).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b) (2) (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-3(c) (1962).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.857-1(b) (1962). Thus, dividends paid to beneficial shareholders
would have to be included in Real Estate Investment Trust taxable income and tax would
have to be paid thereon at standard corporate rates.
21. National REITs may pay as much as $20,000,000 or more during the year as divi-
dend distributions. An extra tax at corporate rates on $20,000,000 would be disastrous even
for the largest REIT.
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relating to specific equity kickers are discussed in section V of this
article.2
B. Proposed Regulations
Recently the Service proposed several significant amendments to the
regulations under section 856.3 While there are several important areas
dealt with in these amendments,24 the area of significance insofar as this
article is concerned relates to the treatment of interest based on net in-
come or profits. This proposal [to amend Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c)(2)
(ii)] would exclude from interest under the 90% and 75% income tests
any amount received on a debt if the determination of the amount "de-
pends in whole or in part on the income or profits of any person." This
rule would become effective for all loans made after December 7, 1972.25
This provision is presumably designed to follow the comparable rule
applicable to rents under section 856(d)(1). The National Association
of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), in a letter dated February
14, 1973, to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has taken the position
(and quite properly so) that there is simply no statutory basis for such
a rule. 6
The statutes and regulations governing REITs contain specific limi-
tations on rental income, and the legislative history explains why.27 These
same statutes, regulations and legislative history omit any similar restric-
tions for interest income. It is difficult to see how the regulations can be
22. It is not the purpose of this article to deal exhaustively with the intricacies of the
Internal Revenue requirements by which REITs must govern their affairs. For articles
dealing more extensively with this topic see, e.g., Klein, Tax Problems of Mortgage Invest-
ment Trusts, THE ARTEuR YOUNG Co. J. 17 (Sept. 1971); Mirsky & Auerbach, REITS:
Problems and Possible Solutions, THE TAX ADvisER, 714 (Dec. 1972); Comment, The Real
Estate Investment Trust: Legal and Economic Aspects, 24 U. MIAmI L. Rv. 155 (1969).
23. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(C)(2)(ii), 37 Fed. Reg. 26014 (1972). For recent
articles on the proposed regulations, see Friedman, Treasury's Proposed Regs. on REITs
First Steps to Solve an Abundance of Problems, 38 J. TAx. 224 (April 1973); Berenson &
Reichler, The Proposed REIT Regulations: A Critique, TEE TAx ADvISan, 282 (May 1973).
24. For example, the proposed regulations: (a) add to examples describing circum-
stances under which a REIT may dispose of property without being deemed to have held
such property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business; (b) eliminate the
limitation that interest income qualifies under the 70% and 75% income tests only if it is
not usurious; (c) provide an apportionment rule for interest income secured by real and
other property; (d) deal with escalation provisions, percentage rents, customary services
and other matters relating primarily to rental income.
25. The proposed cutoff date of December 7, 1972, leaves a real question as to the
status of pre-existing loans in which interest is based on profits. It could mean that the
Service, because of its previous unpublished position to the contrary, does not intend to
treat as unqualified income that interest computed as a percentage of profits or net income
from loans made previous to December 7, 1972. If so, it would seem appropriate to state
this position affirmatively.
26. It is readily apparent that the Service is legislating rather than regulating in pro-
posing such a rule. If it is successful in such an effort, then undoubtedly this provision will
be used to justify the application of other non-interest rules contained in the REIT sections
of the Code and the regulations thereunder. The "boot strap" implications in the adoption
of the rule, as proposed, are obvious.
27. H.R. REP. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), cited in, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 819.
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justified by the "discovery" at this late date of any basis in the legisla-
tive history for this kind of limitation.
Furthermore, the Service is, in effect, saying that interest, for pur-
poses of section 856, will be defined differently than for other sections of
the Internal Revenue Code. It is difficult to understand the rationale for
such a position, and in light of the absence of statutory authority and the
existence of case authority to the contrary,2" the regulation is probably
invalid. Hopefully, the Service will reconsider its proposed position and
allow interest, for purposes of section 856, to be defined in a traditional
manner. There certainly seem to be sufficient safeguards and controls over
REITs and their income and activities without adding a tortured defini-
tion of interest.
Finally, the proposed regulation can be expected to lead to the ap-
plication of other rental rules to the interest area by the Service. Not only
does such a possibility add further uncertainty for a REIT and its adviser,
it could require the REIT as a lender to attempt to exercise controls (such
as over subtenants of its tenant-borrower) which, as a practical matter,
are inappropriate.
C. Real Estate Investment Act of 1973
On October 24, 1973, several members of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee introduced H.R. 11083, entitled "Real Estate Investment Trust
Act of 1973." The Bill was drafted by the staff of the Congressional Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation on the basis of NAREIT pro-
posals summarized in an explanation distributed to its members on Sep-
tember 29, 1972. The Bill proposes a number of changes in the present
law designed to avoid the disqualification of a REIT where the failure to
meet certain statutory qualification tests is inadvertent or due to circum-
stances presented by necessary acts of a REIT in the mortgage lending
business.
For example, the Bill proposes to treat commitment fees as qualified
income under the 75% income test, the elimination of the need for allocat-
ing rental income between real and personal property where the rent
attributable to personal property does not exceed 15% of the total rent,
treats as qualified rental income any separate charges received for cus-
tomary services and permits REITs to use the corporate form. In addition,
the Bill adopts the principal of taxation of non-qualified income instead
of disqualification if certain conditions are met, provides for a late desig-
nation of capital gains and a deficiency dividend procedure. The Bill
expands the statutory definition of interests in real property to include
options to purchase such property which would have the effect of treating
income from such options as qualified under the 75% income test and the
28. Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner,
284 U.S. 552 (1932); see also Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 54; Rev. Rul. 72-2,
1972 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 2, at 11.
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options would be treated as real estate assets under the 75% asset test.
The 90% income test has been increased to 95%. In other words, non-
qualified income (other than gains from the sale of inventory property)
may not exceed 5% of the REIT's gross income. In the same vein, the
30% income test limiting the amount of gross income which may be
derived from the sale of securities and real property held for less than
four years is expanded to cover income from the sale of mortgages held
for less than four years.
In the foreclosure area the Bill provides that gains from the sale of
foreclosure property and income from the operation of such property,
which do not meet the income tests, are taxable without disqualification
consequences upon election by the REIT. The election period is limited
to two years with two one-year extensions if shown to be necessary for
the orderly liquidation of the property. Also, the Bill requires the REIT
to install an independent contractor within 90 days of acquisition to
manage the property along with several other restrictions relative to new
leases.
One of the areas in the REIT Code sections which has created the
greatest concern is the holding for sale provision of section 856(a)(4).
The Bill changes this rule by eliminating section 856(a) (4) prohibiting
a trust from holding any property for sale and allows a REIT to have up
to 1% of its gross income from such sources, with the income from this
source being taxed at corporate rates. Any income from such sources in
excess of 1% would be subject to an additional tax rather than disqualify
the REIT, provided the REIT had reasonable ground to believe that the
excess income would not be determined to be from such sources.
While the Bill did not follow NAREIT's proposals in every respect,
the relief provided, if adopted, will certainly eliminate some of the areas
of greatest concern to REITs and their advisers.
III. CHARACTER AND SOURCE OF INCOME
To insure that equity kickers comply with the income tests set forth
in the Code, a REIT must be concerned with both the character and the
source of income generated by the kicker. A minimum of 75% of a REIT's
gross income must be derived from real property assets; another 15%
must be derived either from real property assets, dividends and interest,
or gains from the sale of stock, securities or real property. Ten percent
of the trust gross income is unlimited, as to character or source, except for
the prohibitions against income from the active conduct of business and
from holding property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of its trade or business.29 The application of these provisions, both
29. It appears from the committee reports that some income may be derived from non-
passive income sources and from the active conduct of a trade or business. H.R. REP. No.
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as to character and source of income, is complex and difficult, especially
in the area of equity kickers. Where an equity kicker is negotiated in con-
junction with a loan transaction, the desired characterization is that of
interest income, whereas if negotiated in connection with an equity in-
vestment, the desired characterization is one of rental income.
The Code does not contain a definition of the word interest. Section
163(a), dealing with the deductibility of interest, states that "[t]here
shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness."'" The Service has accepted a definition
of interest stated as "the amount which one has contracted to pay for
the use of borrowed money" 2 and "compensation allowed by law or fixed
by the parties for use, or forebearance, or detention of money." 3 As will
be seen in the discussion of various types of equity kickers, whether the
income qualifies as "interest" for purposes of section 856 of the Code is
not as simple as the quoted definitions would indicate.
In addition to the consideration which must be given to the courts'
definition of interest and its application to REITs by the Service, there
are other factors which are particularly relevant to equity kickers. For
example, while there is no requirement that interest, to be deductible,
must be reasonable in amount, excessive payments of interest have been
challenged and the question raised as to whether the interest paid was in
2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), cited in 1960-2, Cum. BULL. 819, 822. However, the
Service has taken the position, in a private ruling dated March 12, 1971, that a REIT may
not engage in a service business, nor in the active conduct of any business, even though such
business does not involve holding any property primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of a trade or business. The Service, in rendering its interpretation of congres-
sional intent, stated:
We consider that this language (to the effect that the greater part of the income
of the trust must be from passive sources) was used by Congress to show it did
not intend real estate investment trusts to be disqualified by the casual or acci-
dental receipt of types of income derived from dealing in real estate or interests
therein, and not to allow such trusts to purposely engage in the active operation
of a service type business.
Merritt, Primarily For Sale and Prohibited Purposes, P.L.I. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
TRUSTS 3d, No. 41, 7 (1971). An application of the Service's position appears in Rev. Rul.
72-353, 1972 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 9, dealing with the receipt by a REIT of rental in-
come based upon profits, which did not disqualify the REIT as long as the profits were less
than 10% of its gross income. See also Memorandum from NAREIT (National Association
of Real Estate Investment Trusts) to members, August 15, 1972; Shop Talk, 38 J. TAX. 199
(Sept. 1972).
30. Since the major thrust of this article relates to the structuring and use of equity
kickers by mortgage trusts, the definitional and source problems relating to what is "rents
from real property" will be discussed only where they are analogous to the interest area (or
at least have been construed as analogous by the Service).
31. There is no requirement that interest be reasonable in amount to be deductible as
there is for rent or compensation payments. See Kanter, The Interest Deduction: When and
How Does It Work, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 87 (1963).
32. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932).
33. Rev. Rul. 68-6, 1968-1 Cum. BuLL. 325, 326, citing Fall River Elec. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 23 B.T.A. 168, 171 (1931). See also Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940);
Kena Inc., 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941); Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 54; Rev. Rul.
56-136, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 92.
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fact something else, merely identified as interest for the convenience of
the parties to the transaction."4 This point will be discussed further in
connection with the passivity restrictions of REITs.
While the courts and Service have stated that it is unncessary for
the parties to label payments as interest in order for it to be deductible
as such when it is paid for the use of borrowed money," both have also
stated that the mere characterization placed on payments by the parties
is not binding. For example, the mere fact that the parties intended to
create a debtor-creditor relationship is not conclusive. In Farley Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner,6 the court held that:
Just as the Commissioner may ignore the labels the parties have
placed upon their relationship when these labels fail to describe
the realities of the relationship, so too the parties' bona fide in-
tentions may be ignored if the relationship the parties have
created does not coincide with their intentions. 7
Treasury Regulation 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii) provides that interest, for
purposes of sections 856(c)(2)(B) and 856(c)(3)(D), includes "only
the amount which constitutes lawful interest for the loan or forebearance
of money. Thus ...usurious or illegal interest ... shall not be in-
cluded as interest.""8 The proposed regulations, if adopted in their present
form, would eliminate this requirement."9
IV. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
(Holding Property Primarily For Sale to Customers
in the Ordinary Course of a Trade or Business)
A paramount consideration in negotiating and structuring equity
kickers (apart from the characterization and source of the income) is
whether, in the manner of computing the equity kicker or because of its
structure, it can be argued that the REIT is violating the passivity and
operational limitations of the Code. The principal restriction on the activ-
34. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1959) ; In re Indian Lake Estates,
Inc., 448 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. L-R Heat Treating Co., 28 T.C. 894 (1957); Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 Cum. BULL.
54.
36. 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960).
37. Id. at 705, citing Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214, 217 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c)(2)(ii) (1962). There is no statutory authority for the
exclusion of usurious interest from the provisions of section 856. In fact, the courts have
held not only that usurious interest is deductible, but that it is and continues to be taxable
as such. Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Jones Syndicate v. Commis-
sioner, 23 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1927).
39. For the problems raised by the usury problem both for state and federal tax pur-
poses, see NAREIT memorandum to members, December 15, 1971; Comment, Usury and
Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Analysis of Treasury Regulation 1.856(c)(2)(ii), 60
CAL. L. REV. 147 (1972); Note, Applicability of State Conflicts When Issues of State Law
Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1955).
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ities of a REIT is found in section 856(a) (4) of the Code. It provides
that for the purposes of sections 856-58, a REIT is defined to mean an
unincorporated association or trust "which does not hold any property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or busi-
ness." The regulations promulgated thereunder state that "whether prop-
erty is held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the trade or
business of a real estate investment trust depends on the facts and circum-
stances in each case.
' 40
The language of section 856(a) (4) has not been subject to judicial
consideration. However, both sections 1221 (1) and 1231 (b) (1) (B) con-
tain the crucial phrase "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."'" This lan-
guage is, of course, virtually identical to the language of section 856(a)
(4). Not only is the language of the two sections virtually identical, but
the purposes behind sections 856 (a) (4) and 1221 (1) are generally com-
parable, to distinguish "passive investment" and "active business." The
many decisions, then, interpreting and applying section 1221(1) and
1231 (b) (1) (B) will have a bearing on the interpretation of section 856
(a) (4). As will be seen, the complexity of REIT transactions may mask
situations in which the Service has raised the question of holding for sale
under sections of the Code using the same language. The seriousness of a
violation of this provision is obvious and far more consequential than the
mere question of ordinary income versus capital gain. If an otherwise
qualified REIT holds one property primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of its trade or business, it would be disqualified for the
entire taxable year.42 The holding for sale question is not unique to situa-
tions dealing with equity kickers but has been raised in connection with
foreclosures, 43 participations44 and options granted in sale leaseback trans-
actions.45
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d) (4) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6928 (1967).
41. One of the most significant cases in recent years is Malat v. Riddeil, 383 U.S. 569
(1969), which held that the word "primarily" means "principally" or "of first importance."
42. The consequences, to mention a few, are: (a) the cash distributions after tax would
be reduced by approximately 50%; (b) a probable permanent impairment of capital by
virtue of having to pay the tax in a year after at least 90% distribution of taxable income;
and (c) a disastrous effect on the REIT's stock in the public market.
43. For example, where the trust forecloses and takes title to an unfinished project, it
must make arrangements, as other lenders do, for the completion and disposition of the
project. If, however, it commenced an extensive effort to complete and market the houses
or lots, it can be argued that this property has become inventory property held by the trust
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business. See White,
Mortgage Foreclosures-Tax Aspects, P.L.I. RAL ESTATE INVESTIENT TRUSTS 4th No. 66,
111-13 (1972); Agger, Tax Problems of Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts, N.Y.U.
31ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1739 (1973). The proposed regulations, while not dealing with the
sales of such properties in a piecemeal fashion, as opposed to bulk sales, will allow a REIT
to complete structures which are above a certain percentage of completion (i.e., 80%). A
difficulty with providing any safe harbours from the application of this provision is the
potential spillover of such exceptions into the interpretations of other sections of the Code.
H.R. 11083, discussed in section C of Article II, infra, solves this problem in part by delet-
ing section 856(a)(4) and instead provides that gains from the sale of foreclosed property
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According to the Internal Revenue Service, the most flagrant viola-
tion of the passivity provisons is the equity kicker which seeks a share of
the net profits of a borrowing entity. In these cases, the lender departs
from its traditional right to receive compensation for the use of borrowed
funds (i.e., an absolute right to receive interest payments irrespective of
profits) and agrees to share in the risks that the borrower or any tradi-
tional investor take; that is, will there be profit and how much. This type
of "risk sharing" parallels that taken by investors, stockholders and other
persons who have a proprietary, as opposed to a creditor, interest in the
project. By entering into such a participation, the trust is exposed to the
analogy of the traditional "risk taking" investor and to the argument that
what was intended (irrespective of the documentation or form of the
transaction) was a joint venture, partnership or some other profit sharing
arrangement whereby all the activities of the business are imputed to each
equity owner. This type of arrangement also presents characterization
problems (i.e., is the payment interest, dividends or a share of partner-
ship profits).
Even those equity kickers which are computed in a manner which
has received acceptance by the Service, at least in private rulings (i.e., a
percentage of gross receipts or revenues), can be troublesome when
structured in a manner that raises questions as to their character. For ex-
ample, suppose a REIT made a three-year loan (either construction or
mini-permanent) with a fixed rate of interest plus an equity kicker of
3 % of gross receipts for 10 years or longer, with provision for the principal
to be repaid during the normal term of the loan. Normally, a kicker com-
puted on a percentage of gross receipts creates no problem, but by struc-
turing the kicker to extend seven years beyond the term and repayment
of the loan, a question is raised as to what the parties really bargained
for. Traditionally, interest ceases at or shortly after the principal is
and income from the operation of such property, which in either case does not meet the
income tests, are taxed at corporate rates if the REIT so elects.
44. Some REITs engage in a substantial number of sales to other lenders of participa-
tions in loan programs. The Service has indicated that where the REIT commits to the en-
tire loan and then participates it to other lenders, this could be the holding of property pri-
marily for sale. Where, however, the REIT commits only to a portion of the loan and
conditions its acceptance on the joint participation of other lenders, it has been indicated
that this does not present the same problems. The proposed regulations do not deal with
this problem, probably because this problem can. be avoided by appropriate care in nego-
tiating and drafting. See Grunderman and White, Mortgage Loans and Participations, P.L.I.
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS-PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES, No. 17, 139-43 (1973).
45. Another potential violation of section 856(a)(4) arises in connection with a com-
mon practice in sale-leaseback transactions of granting to the seller-lessee an option to re-
purchase the property. The question here is whether the REIT is holding the option pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business. The prospectus
for the Institutional Investor's Trust dated July 20, 1972, indicated that the Service has
ruled that such options are not being held for sale while they are unexercisable. In all likeli-
hood, where the option is exercisable at a price reflecting fair market value and where there
are no economic factors tending to require exercise, the Service should be willing to assume
that the primary purpose of the transaction was the collection of rent and that the option
was merely incidental thereto. The proposed regulations do not deal with the holding of
options primarily for sale. See Agger, Tax Problems of Mortgage Real Estate Investment
Trusts, N.Y.U. 31ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1739 (1973).
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repaid, yet here we have payments continuing long beyond the debt itself.
If the Service attempts to reclassify the character of the payment, it must
find some other category in which to place the payments. If the borrow-
ing entity is a partnership or joint venture, the Service might say that
the trust has become a partner or joint venturer. If the borrower is a
corporation, it might say that the trust has become a stockholder of a
special class of stock. In either event, the trust and the borrower might
well face litigation over the character of the payment (as well as over
deductibility from the borrower's viewpoint), and the trust faces the
possibility of being considered to be engaged in an active business.
The intent of the parties will normally govern the treatment of a
payment as to its character and also as to the type of relationship bar-
gained for and created, provided, of course, that the relationship created
was what was intended. Since intent is a subjective matter, the courts and
the Service look to less subjective criteria in order to test the stated
intent. Care should be exercised to insure that all documents and con-
versations, as well as negotiations, are consistent with the intent. You
can expect the courts and the Service to be persuaded not only by the
legal documents evidencing the transaction, but also by the loan submis-
sion and letters between the trust and the borrower, as well as between
their respective counsel. Serious doubt may be cast on the entire charac-
terization and structuring of an equity kicker where the negotiations and
the documents evidencing the loan speak not of interest or additional
consideration for the loan, but of net profits, joint venture and other words
of similar import.
In Rev. Rul. 73-398,46 the Service held that a REIT that sold several
long-term fully funded mortgages to an unrelated mortgage broker in a
single isolated transaction to correct an imbalance in its loan portfolio
was not considered to be holding property primarily for sale to customers
within the meaning of section 856 (a) (4) of the Code. The stated purpose
for the sale was to reduce investments in long-term loans and increase
investments in short and intermediate-term loans thereby improving its
competitive position in borrowing money. The trust represented that it
had not sold any mortgages in the past and did not intend to engage in
any other selling activities. Because of the limited facts, the ruling will
probably not be of great benefit to other REITs except to indicate that
the Service will rule favorably in the holding for sale area given certain
facts and a good business reason for the sale.
V. PARTICULAR EQUITY KICKERS
A. Stock, Warrants and Convertible Interests
The Code contains two restrictions upon a REIT's acquisition of an
ownership interest in another entity. One restriction relates to an asset
test and the other to the qualification of rental income. Section 856(c)
46. 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 39, at 14.
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(5) (B) requires, in pertinent part, that a REIT not have, at the close
of any quarterly period, more than 25% of the value of its total assets
represented by securities (other than government securities). Further, the
REIT (within the 25% limitation) may not own securities of any one
issuer of a value greater than 5%o of the trust's total assets or represent-
ing more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer.
The second restriction is derived from the definition, in section 856(d)
(2)(A), of "rents from real property," which excludes any amount re-
ceived or accrued, directly or indirectly, from any corporation if the REIT
owns, directly or indirectly, stock possessing 10% or more of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or 10% or
more of the total number of shares of all classes of stock. This exclusion
from the definition of "rents from real property" was intended by Con-
gress to prevent the avoidance of the passive income restrictions through
the device of setting up a related corporation. The limitation in the asset
test "was designed to provide diversification in any of the trust invest-
ments other than the real estate assets . . .,.
While all REITs must be concerned with compliance with the re-
stricted ownership of voting securities for asset test purposes, only equity
REITs or those which negotiate for a rental return on their investment
need be concerned with the 10% rule relating to the definition of "rents
from real property." A safe course of action, however, would be to
qualify all investments under both standards so that, in the event of
reclassification or subsequent mixed financing packages, the income will
be qualified.
The REIT sections do not define the term "voting security" but do
incorporate by reference the definition contained in the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940." s There, the term "voting security" is defined to mean
"any security presently entitling the owner or holder thereof to vote for
the election of directors of a company." The word "security" is further
defined by the Act to include "any . . . stock.
49
47. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1960), cited in 1960-2 Cum. BULL.
819 at 822-23. The 10% voting stock restriction of section 856(c) (5) (B) appears to be in-
effective to achieve the stated purpose since it has no relationship to the value of the assets
of the trust. In light of the restriction, in the same section, on ownership of securities of
any one issuer having a value more than 5% of the trust's total assets, it may be that the
10% restriction was designed to prevent REITs from engaging in the active conduct of a
trade or business.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(42) (1970) as made applicable to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 856(c) (6) (D).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1970). The definition of "security" in the Investment
Company Act includes many specific types of instruments such as notes, bonds, debentures,
evidence of indebtedness, and a general reference to "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security" and to the "right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing." Thus, any hybrid type instrument which carries the right to vote for directors
of the issuer could be subject to classification as a "voting security" under the Act. The
term "securities" does not, however, include "interest in real property" or "real estate assets"
as those terms are defined in section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and in
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(e) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6841 (1965).
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The percentage of ownership of non-voting stock is not restricted
for purposes of the asset tests and REITs can acquire ownership of all
or a substantial percentage of such classes of stock as equity kickers."
Generally, the articles of incorporation of the borrower do not au-
thorize or provide for the issuance of either a second class of stock which
is non-voting or of non-voting shares of stock within the same class.
Counsel for the REIT must, therefore, see not only that such a class of
stock is authorized by appropriate modification of enabling instruments
of the corporation and that the stock is validly issued, but also that the
corporate laws of the state of incorporation authorize several classes of
stock or distinctions within a class of stock.
Should additional rights be negotiated for the class of stock the REIT
receives, such as preferences on dividend distributions and liquidation,5
these rights must also be specified in the articles, approved by share-
holders and directors, where required, and sanctioned by the statutory or
decisional law of the state of incorporation. Failure to give careful at-
tention to such details can cause the trust's shares to be illegally or de-
fectively issued, resulting in both state law and federal tax law problems.
The Service has taken the position52 that stock warrants, share-
holders' voting agreements, stock options, convertible debentures and
similar rights do not constitute "voting securities" for purposes of section
851(b) (4) of the Code (relating to Regulated Investment Companies).
The ruling cites as authority the requirements of section 851 (b) (4), which
contains 'a 10% voting security rule similar to that contained in section
856(c)(5)(B), and the definition of "voting security" contained in the
Investment Company Act of 1940.11 Thus, it would seem to be relatively
safe for a REIT to also obtain such interests without fear of violating the
percentage limitation restricting ownership of voting securities. 4 Utiliza-
50. If, however, a trust were receiving rents frdm a corporation in which it owned a
percentage of non-voting stock in excess of 10% of the total number of shares of all
classes of stock, the rental income would not qualify as "rents from real property" and
therefore would fall into the 10% basket of unqualified income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
856(d) (2) (A).
51. In light of the restricted definition of "voting securities" in the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, it would seem that limited voting rights might be negotiated. Con-
sidering the risks of overstepping the statutory restrictions in the Code as interpreted by
the Service (or for that matter an amendment of the Investment Company Act of 1940
expanding the definition of "voting securities"), and the limited benefits obtained from
such limited voting rights, it hardly seems prudent to negotiate such rights.
52. Rev. Rul. 66-339, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 275.
53. The ruling also cites Rev. Rul. 64-251, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 338, which holds that
unexercised warrants do not constitute stock ownership for purposes of INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1504(a). A subsequent ruling under the same section held that non-voting stock
convertible into common stock is not included in ascertaining the voting power of all
classes of stock. Rev. Rul. 71-83, 1971-1 Cum. BULL. 268. See also Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1
Cum. BULL. 106, which held that convertible debentures do not constitute stock for pur-
poses of section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code; Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 298,
which held that options, warrants and debentures convertible into common stock do not
affect a corporation's eligibility for treatment as a Subchapter S corporation.
54. Warrants or other rights to acquire stock may present particular problems in the
19721
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
tion of warrants or convertible debentures are attractive since they allow
a REIT to potentially acquire a larger percentage of voting stock of the
borrower than could be obtained by immediate ownership.
From an investment point of view, stock ownership is generally not
as attractive as other types of equity kickers, although in most cases, it
is easier to negotiate and structure. Because of the small percentage of
voting stock that a REIT can own, it can be and often is at the mercy of
the majority shareholders on matters such as dividend distributions,
liquidations, high risk ventures and milking tactics. More stock can
potentially be obtained through warrants and convertible debentures, 55
and buy-sell agreements can be negotiated, but where more than 10% of
the voting stock is acquired, it must be disposed of within the same
quarter.5 Aside from the difficulty in marketing closely held corpora-
tion's stock in such a short time, the REIT must be careful not to hold
these shares primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its
trade or business, nor to derive more income of this character than al-
lowed by the 30% income test of section 856(c) (4).57
To counter these problems, the REIT might seek to obtain maximum
rights in connection with its stock or warrants, such as preferential divi-
dends (both in time and amount), restrictions on voting rights of the
other stockholders and control of key decisions of the corporation. Care
must be exercised not to create a situation where the Service could argue
that such rights converted non-voting to voting stock or gave the REIT
more voting power than 10% of the stock to which it is entitled.5"
computation of stock ownership for purposes of disqualifying "rents from real property."
The broader language of this section (direct or indirect ownership) and the failure to
limit it to outstanding stock have caused some concern that warrants and similar rights
may be included in the computation.
55. If the conversion feature and other aspects of the transaction caused the note to
be treated as stock under section 385 of the Code, problems could arise under the income
and asset tests. It has been suggested that receipt of such convertible debentures should be
deferred until regulations under that section are promulgated. While this is obviously the
prudent approach, there is little probability that these regulations will be promulgated in
the near future because of lessening public and congressional concern about the conglom-
erate movement cited as one of the reasons for the original enactment of the statute.
56. While section 856(c)(5) of the Code (last paragraph) allows elimination of cer-
tain "discrepancies" within 30 days after the quarter in which triggered or created without
losing REIT status, it is doubtful that the 30 day grace period is applicable to the dis-
position of outstanding voting securities of an issuer in excess of the 10% limitation. The
legislative history of section 856 indicates that the 30 day rule is similar to that contained
in section 851(d). H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), cited in 1960-2 Cum.
BULL. 819, 825. A review of the legislative history of section 851(d) and a literal reading
of section 856(c)(5) indicates that the word "discrepancy" in that section relates only to a
discrepancy between the "value" of its various investments and such requirements and not
all discrepancies. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1942), cited in 1942-2 Cum.
BuLL. 372 at 463; Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2 (d) (4), example 3 (1962).
57. The 5% asset test must also be considered. Thus, stock or warrants of a single
borrower plus that portion of the borrower's indebtedness deemed secured by personalty
cannot together exceed 5% of the trust's total assets. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(5)
(B).
58. For example, in Glover Packing Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 342 (Ct. C1. 1964),
the court was faced with the question of whether certain shares were "outstanding" for
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In addition to the above, consideration should be given to the follow-
ing:
(1) Non-dilution rights as well as an agreement to piggyback the
REIT's shares on the first registration should be, if possible, negotiated
and at no additional cost. In addition, restrictions or at least notice pro-
visions should be required from the borrower on the redemption of stock
since such a redemption could propel the trust into the ownership of more
than 10% of the borrower's outstanding voting securities. 9
(2) Once stock ownership has been obtained, the REIT must be
vigilant in subsequent dealings with the same borrower, affiliated corpora-
tions or major shareholders thereof, to avoid the acquisition of additional
stock which, by attribution, will place the trust in the position of owning
more than 10% of the voting stock or 10% or more of the combined
total of all classes of stock.60
(3) Merely requiring a pledge of all the voting stock of a corpora-
tion in connection with a mortgage loan would not violate the require-
ments of section 856(c) (5) (B) if it is clear that the stock is transferred
only as collateral. Problems can arise, however, if by the terms of the
pledge the REIT acquires ownership automatically upon default. Some
states require that formal and time consuming steps be taken before stock
can be sold or transferred. Even if the REIT undertook to liquidate the
corporation and distribute the assets, it might not be able to comply with
applicable state and federal tax requirements before the end of its tax
quarter. It should be clearly provided that the pledgor retains at least
some voting rights61 and that the REIT's rights, upon default, are to
sell the stock to a third party on behalf of the pledgor rather than to
acquire legal title to it.
(4) The receipt of stock or convertible rights thereto as an equity
kicker presents valuation and characterization problems, as well as
purposes of section 382. The purchaser received only 10% of the loss corporation's stock,
the remaining shares being placed in escrow. No dividends could be paid on the escrowed
shares, nor could they be sold or hypothecated, and they were subject to redemption. The
court held that these shares were not "outstanding". See Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2)
(1963).
59. Although the violation of said restrictions could subject the borrower to an ac-
tion for breach of contract or damages, this will be of little consolation to the REIT
which faces disqualification. The Service might be persuaded to rule, in such a case, that
such a violation was not fatal. In Rev. Rul. 64-247, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 179, the Service
held that a regulated investment company was not disqualified even though it received
proceeds of a lawsuit for recovery of excessive management fees which exceeded the ap-
plicable income limitations under section 851 of the Code.
60. INT. Rv. COD OF 1954, §§ 318(a)(2) and (3), incorporated by reference with
modifications by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(d) (2) and (3), by the last paragraph of
section 856(d). See also Rev. Rul. 70-542, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 148; Memorandum from
NAREIT to members, April 25, 1972.
61. Query whether a provision under state law granting voting rights in pledged stock
to the pledgee would be determined by the Service to technically violate the 10% rule?
See CAL. CoaP. CODE § 2218 (Deering 1962), which allows shares standing in the name of
a pledgee to be voted as well as the exercise of all rights incident thereto without proof of
authority.
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triggering different reporting rules for income tax purposes. It is under-
stood that private rulings have been issued holding that the stock or
warrants produce original issue discount under section 1232 (b) and con-
stitute qualified interest reportable over the life of the loan. This treat-
ment should be contrasted with loans purchased at a discount from their
face amount which are treated as market discount producing no immedi-
ate income. A discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this
article, but the subject is obviously important and must be given careful
consideration .12
B. Contingent Interest
(Percentage and Fixed Dollar)
A commonly used form of equity kicker bases contingent interest or
rent upon either a percentage of or fixed dollar amount of the borrower's
or tenant's receipts, revenues or sales (hereinafter gross income).
Some of the variations commonly used are: (1) a fixed percentage of
gross income (i.e., 7% of gross income); (2) a fixed percentage of gross
income or a fixed dollar amount, whichever is greater or lesser (i.e., 4%
of gross income or $200,000, whichever is greater); (3) a fixed percentage
of gross income over a stated dollar amount (i.e., 5% of gross income over
the first $200,000 of gross income); (4) a fixed percentage of gross in-
come with a floor and also a ceiling (i.e., 5% of gross income or $200,000,
whichever is lesser with a floor of $100,000); (5) a fixed percentage of
gross income based on varying percentage plus an escalator clause; (6) a
fixed percentage of gross income with the computation of gross income
subject to reduction for certain costs (i.e., taxes, insurance, janitorial
services); and (7) varying percentages of gross income (i.e., 2% of the
first $1,000,000 of gross income, 4% of gross income over $1,000,000 and
less than $2,000,000) .63
Some of the types of contingent interests based upon a fixed dollar
amount are: (1) lot release fees; fixed dollar per unit, etc.;64 (2) pre-
62. For a discussion of these problems, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232; Oppen-
heimer, Equity "Kickers" in Mortgage Loans, P.L.I. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 4th,
No. 66, 33 (1972); Oppenheimer, REITs Seeking Equity Kickers Travel a Perilous Sea, 1(Part 4) REAL ESTATE REV. 31 (1972); Penn Yan Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. United
States, 417 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Aggar, Tax Problems of Mortgage Real Estate In-
vestment Trusts, N.Y.U. 31ST INST. OF FED. TAx. 1739 (1973).
63. In addition to the case law in other areas supporting a definition of interest which
would include contingent interest, and the sanction of such computations in the Code and
regulations dealing with "rents from real property" (under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6969 (1968)), there are
a number of private rulings which have held that contingent interest will be considered
interest for purposes of the 75% and 90% tests of sections 856(c)(2)(B) and 856(c)(3)(B). See Memoranda from NAREIT to members, March 2, 1972, March 14, 1972, Decem-
ber 15, 1972 and November 13, 1973; Klauman, Mortgage Trusts-Income Problems,
P.L.I. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 4th, No. 66, 15, 29 (1972); Rev. Rul. 64-50,
1964-1 (Part 1) Cum. BULL. 231; Rev. Rul. 69-107, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 189.
64. These are generally felt to qualify as interest. The rationale is similar to prepay-
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payment premiums, late charges and extension fees (which are not
strictly equity kickers) 65 (3) an interest in the recreational leases of the
common areas in a condominium project; (4) a dollar amount (or per-
centage) of the proceeds from refinancing. This can also be derived from
agreeing to subordinate or in allowing a second mortgage to be placed on
property (or by allowing a wrap-around).66
The preceding lists are by no means exhaustive. The types of per-
centage and fixed dollar equity kickers (from a non-tax standpoint) are
limited only by the nature of the project owned or being financed and the
imagination of the underwriter. 7 The fixed dollar type of equity kicker
is generally favored by the lender because realization can be computed
and timed. Further, such kickers are less controlled by the borrower's
actions, and they can be secured and are payable irrespective of whether
the borrower meets his projections or makes a profit. The latter result is
obviously not attractive to the borrower or tenant and may result in an
attempted de-emphasis of potential appreciation, receipts or gain in order
to keep the kicker amount as small as possible.
An unusual aspect of contingent interest is its relation to the principal
as compared to conventional or fixed interest. Since contingent interest
generally will increase as the loan amortizes, whereas conventional in-
terest decreases, the economic consequence is contrary to the concept that
interest is being paid for the use or forebearance of money. The Service
has expressed some concern that contingent interest. resembles a profit
participation with the borrower.68 The REIT sections already exclude
ment penalties and since the lender has reduced its security, a higher interest rate may be
justified. Additional risks may be encountered if the Service can establish that the pay-
ment was for services performed by the lender. See Memoranda from NAREIT to mem-
bers, November 13, 1973.
65. General American Life Insurance Co., 25 T.C. 1265 (1956), acquiesced in 1956-2
Cum. BuLL 5; Rev. Rul. 57-198, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 94; Memoranda from NAREIT to
members, November 24, 1972, and January 7, 1972; Rev. Rul. 73-141, 1973 INT. REV.
BuLL. No. 12, at 9; private rulings. Although there is some authority that late charges, at
least in the municipal bond area, are penalties, it is felt that those cases are distinguishable
and that the better rule is that the payments qualify as interest for the 75% income test.
Extension fees appear to be analogous to points or other fees charged for keeping the loan
outstanding longer. Grossly disproportionate premiums, charges and fees should be avoided
as they can be considered penalties as opposed to interest.
66. It would seem that receipt of a percentage or fixed dollar amount of the pro-
ceeds from refinancing, subordination or allowing a second mortgage or wrap-around mort-
gage to be placed on the property is income that qualifies for the 75% and 90% income
tests as either interest or gain from the sale or other disposition of real property, which
includes interest in real property and mortgages on real property. Other possibilities are
that the payments will be treated as rental income if the REIT is subordinating its fee to
additional financing; see the dictum in Rev. Rul. 70-132, 1970-1 Cum. B-LL. 138; Stahl v.
United States, 441 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1970); or as payments in the nature of commit-
ment or standby fees. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-455, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 9.
67. The real point of negotiation between the lender's representatives and the borrower
is not how but how much. Structuring will generally be affected, from a timing stand-
point, by the cash needs and projected revenues of the borrower.
68. This attitude makes it doubly important that all documentation connected with the
negotiation and documentation of the transaction, as well as that of the equity kicker, be
consistent with the intent to receive contingent interest which is not merely a recomputed
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from the definition of "rents from real property" any amounts-the de-
termination of which depends on the income or profits from such prop-
erty."9 While the same section states that any amount received shall not
be excluded from the definition solely by reason of its being based on a
fixed percentage or percentages of receipts or sales, the regulations con-
tain the admonition that "an amount will not qualify as 'rents from real
property' if, considering the lease and all the surrounding circumstances,
the arrangement does not conform with normal business practices but is
in reality used as a means of basing the rent on income or profits."70 The
same factors used in determining whether percentage rents are in effect
a profit sharing arrangement may be deemed by the Service to be ap-
plicable to a REIT receiving contingent interest based on a percentage of
gross revenues, even though no such statutory or regulatory limitations
exist in the "interest" area.7
In at least one private ruling, in 1970, the Service held that con-
tingent interest equal to 50% of the borrower's net profits from the sale
of the development was "interest on obligations secured by mortgages on
real property" for purposes of section 856(c) (3) (B). It should be noted
that there was no mention of the profit sharing arrangement.72 The pro-
posed regulations clearly indicate that the Service has reconsidered its
position, and that the same ruling could not be obtained today. A corollary
to such a position would be a finding that the REIT and the borrower
have, in effect, formed a joint venture or partnership which might dis-
qualify the trust.
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percentage of net income or profits. Side agreements, discussions of a share of profits, ex-
cessive deletions from gross income to arrive at a base for computing the kicker, and ex-
tremely -refined stairstep computations should be avoided. See, e.g., Paul W. Frenzel, 22
CCH TAX CT. MEM. 26,347 (1963).
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(1).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6969 (1968). This is, of
course, not a novel position for the Service to take, since the substance versus form argu-
ment is a vital part of the enforcement of the tax law generally.
71. There is already evidence of such an attempt in the proposed regulations to dis-
qualify interest income based on the income or profits of any person.
72. The REIT made a construction loan based upon 85% of the appraised value of
the project (its normal loan to value ratio was stated to be 80%), with interest at 9%
plus a 1/2% loan fee. The trust also issued a standby commitment to make a permanent
loan at the same ratio and fixed interest, but with additional interest equal to 50% of the
borrower's net profits. The ruling request indicated that the additional interest was com-
pensation for making an interim construction loan in excess of the REIT's normal loan to
value ratio. The only case cited in the ruling was Brown v. Cardozo, 67 Cal. App. 2d 187,
153 P.2d 767 (1st Dist. 1944).
73. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(a)(4) and (b). For a discussion of what factors
the courts have considered in non-REIT tax litigation in determining whether a joint ven-
ture was intended, see Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20 (1965), acquiesced in, 1970-2 Cum.
BULL. XXI. Generally, a REIT is not willing to suffer an adverse ruling on the character
of the income and, thus, the ruling is withdrawn. Recently, at a Practising Law Institute
Seminar on Real Estate Investment Trusts held in New York City, one of the lecturers
spoke of a situation where a REIT was willing to incur an adverse ruling on the charac-
terization and pressed for an answer to the joint venture question. Apparently the Service
advised the applicant to withdraw the ruling, thus indicating that an adverse ruling would
have been received.
1972] EQUITY PARTICIPATIONS
In some cases, the payment of contingent interest may extend beyond
the term of repayment of the loan to which it relates."4 A typical example
would be a lot or unit release fee which is collected at the time of sale
with the loan completely amortized after only 85% of sales. Recently the
Service was requested by a REIT to rule on the character of contingent
interest payments of a fixed dollar amount which were to extend beyond
repayment of the loan.75 Prior to a formal ruling, the REIT amended the
transaction to require the contingent interest payments to be made prior
to termination of the loan program. After the amendment, a favorable
ruling was issued but the clear implication was that such would not have
been the case had the transaction not been amended.76 The effect of such
a position, even if not retroactively applied, could be disastrous, if not
fatal, to REITs heavily invested in this type of contingent interest.7
The rationale of the Service's position could be that, without an
underlying indebtedness, the payments cannot be characterized as in-
terest.7" This would seem to be a very restricted interpretation of in-
terest,79 more related to the time of receipt than to the substance of the
transaction. 0 Another possibility is that the Service is reclassifying the
74. The reasons are varied. In some cases the kicker is intentionally negotiated for a
longer period or is extended to accommodate the borrower's cash flow needs. In others, it
is caused by an accelerated schedule of repayment, with the principal of the loan amor-
tized prior to the sellout of the project. The latter is typical of construction and develop-
ment loans.
75. The author understands that the REIT made a three-year development loan and
negotiated a $1500 lot release fee which extended for seven years, with a balloon payment
at that time on all unsold lots. The Service's position was that the contingent interest was
not "interest" for purposes of the 75% or 90% tests, even as to amounts paid during the
term of the loan. They did not, however, contend that the trust was holding property
primarily for sale; i.e., no passivity question was raised.
76. See Prospectus, dated July 20, 1972, of Institutional Investor's Trust, at 5, which
states that "the Internal Revenue Service held that if additional interest may be received
after a loan is paid in full, any additional interest received at any time on such loan
would not qualify as 'interest' for purposes of the 75% and 90% income tests. . ....
77. If a REIT, in consideration of the Service's position, sought to sell the loans which
contained such equity kickers, it could be deemed to be holding property primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of its business. Perhaps it could be argued that the
trustees, in selling the tainted loans, were merely complying with their fiduciary duty to
protect the trust from disqualification and did not intend to violate the holding for sale
provision of section 856 (a) (4).
78. In the past, the Service has taken issue with the characterization as interest of
payments made prior to the existence of an indebtedness. The same argument could be
made concerning payments after an indebtedness has been extinguished. Rev. Rul. 56-136,
1956-1 Cum. ButLL. 92; Memorandum from NAREIT to members, November 24, 1972.
Compare Norman Titcher, 57 T.C. No. 32 (1971), with Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 CuM.
BuLL. 54, and Rev. Rul. 72-524, 1972 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 44, at 16.
79. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163, which allows a deduction for interest paid or
accrued on "indebtedness." An argument could be made that the character of these pay-
ments is determined by the intent of the parties at the time the loan is negotiated, and
that if they are in fact being made and required as compensation for the use and forbear-
ance of money (instead of as an equity interest in the project), the timing of their re-
ceipt by the trust should be immaterial. Even if the payments ultimately are not secured
by a mortgage or by an interest in real property, they should qualify as interest, at least
for the 90% income test.
80. The REIT could negotiate the right to sell, assign or transfer the contingent in-
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debt as an equity interest under the rationale of section 385. If so, then
not only the contingent interest but also the fixed interest would not
qualify for the 75%o income test.
It has been suggested that the Service is applying the Code and
regulatory provisions dealing with the definition of what is and is not
"rent from real property" for the determination of what is "interest" for
purposes of the 75% and 90% income tests."' In other words, the Service
seems to be taking the position that interest for purposes of section 856
has a different and more restricted definition than for other sections of
the Code and as defined by the courts.8 2
Carrying this position through to its logical (or illogical) conclusion,
it would mean that where the Service has determined that the contingent
interest received is unqualified because it is based on the net income or
profits of the borrower (or where the borrower's gross income is based
on the net income of another), then not only is the contingent interest
disqualified but also the fixed interest.8 3 Thus, even where the REIT did
not receive a contingent interest beyond the term of the loan, the con-
tingent and fixed interest could be subject to treatment as unqualified
income. The first published effort by the Service in establishing this posi-
tion is that taken in the proposed regulations.
C. Equity Interests in Properties Financed
In some cases the borrower is willing to either convey or give an
option to the trust to purchase some portion of the project, usually at a
price well below market value. This usually occurs where the trust has
made a "seed" money, development or land loan. Some variations of this
type of equity kicker are: (1) an option to acquire, or the acquisition of,
a specific portion of the land, improvements or both; (2) an option to
acquire, or the acquisition of, an undivided interest in the land, improve-
ments or both; (3) an option to acquire, or the acquisition of, all of the
land; (4) an option to acquire an interest in the borrowing entity where
it is a partnership or proprietorship; (5) convertible debentures, con-
vertible into a limited or general partnership interest; 84 or (6) a sale-lease-
back.
terest if it deems it appropriate or necessary to do so. Query whether an evergreen loan
concept would solve the problem? It might if the Service's position is as technical as it
seems. See NAREIT memorandum to members concerning the taking by a REIT of a note
for the contingent interest (Dec. 21, 1973).
81. Such a position has no support in the legislative history of the REIT sections, in
the regulations thereunder, or in published rulings. There is no restrictive definition of in-
terest in the REIT regulations as there is for "rents from real property." Further, these two
types of income are not similarly treated in the application of other Code sections.
82. If so, this is a departure from its position in a private ruling dated March 15,
1972, which stated: "Nothing in Section 856 of the Code indicates that the word 'interest'
is used differently than as defined above." See Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), on
which the ruling relied, and Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(b)(1) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6841 (1965).
84. This type of equity kicker more properly might be treated under the stock, war-
EQUITY PARTICIPATIONS
One of the initial considerations for the trust is whether to take actual
ownership or an option. Where ownership is acquired, the trust will
generally realize income reportable over the life of the loan in an amount
equal to the difference between the purchase price and the value of the
property.s Since future construction and development of the property
is contemplated, the trust must be cautious not to allow the borrower-
developer's activities to be imputed to the trust. If the trust's property
is being developed by the borrower simultaneously with his own, the
Service may raise the spectre of joint venture or partnership causing
passivity problems. This can be partially relieved by the trust net leasing
the property back to the borrower.8 6
An option will eliminate some of these problems but probably will not
be considered an "interest in real property;" therefore, the income will
qualify only for the 90% income test. Even where an option is taken, the
option price is usually so nominal that an argument can be made that, in
substance, ownership was acquired immediately. 7 This problem is further
complicated where an undivided interest is taken (by option or fee owner-
ship) and the development scheme is either mixed 8 or undetermined,
since it is difficult to segregate or control the activities of the borrower-
developer. Taking an ownership position in a specific portion of the land,
as opposed to an undivided interest, is sometimes unattractive where the
development is mixed or undetermined, since the trust runs the risk of
selecting a parcel which will not yield as large a return as another.89
rants and convertible interests section of this article, except that here we are dealing pri-
marily with noncorporate borrowers. It also could be used in a situation where the cor-
porate borrower plans to convert into a partnership at some time in the future. A deben-
ture convertible into a limited or general partnership interest may resolve the reclassifica-
tion problems of section 385 since that section affects only corporations. This does not
mean that the loan could not be reclassified as an equity interest under general tax law
principles. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 30, at 8; Rev. Rul. 72-
135, 1972 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 13, at 16.
85. By analogy to the Service's position on stock acquired as additional "interest",
this method would seem to be appropriate and the income would qualify for the 75% and
90% income tests. If the borrower is a corporation, it could be argued that the value of
the equity interest produces original issue discount, accounted for over the life of the loan.
Even where the borrower is not a corporation, there is no reason why section 1232 prin-
ciples should not be applicable. If not, then the value may have to be accounted for in the
year of receipt, thus, increasing the REIT's taxable income, of which 90% must be dis-
tributed to its shareholders.
86. For further discussion of the considerations this raises, see Oppenheimer, REITs
Seeking Equity Kickers Travel a Perilous Sea, 2 (Part 4) REAL ESTATE REV. 31, 35 (Winter
1972).
87. While this would have the effect of qualifying the "interest" for purposes of the
75% income test, it raises the other problems discussed in connection with actual owner-
ship. Perhaps the greatest detriment, however, from a reclassification standpoint, is that
usually steps are not taken to protect against reclassification, thereby causing a potentially
far more dangerous problem than those recognized initially and accounted for. H.R. 11083
would expand the statutory definition of interests in real property to include options to
purchase such property. This would qualify the income and asset for the 75% income and
asset tests.
88. "Mixed" implies a concurrent development of apartments, shopping centers and
single family residences, etc.
89. For example, if the trust is negotiating for 10% of the revenue from the project
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When an option is taken rather than fee ownership, then it should be in
recordable form for security and also tailored to anticipate a possible
reclassification or joint venture determination by the Service. °
Section 856(c)(4) provides, in part, that a REIT must have less
than 30% of its gross income from the sale or other disposition of stocks
or securities held for less than six months and real property (including
"interest in real property") not compulsorily or involuntarily converted,
held for less than four years. Should the trust receive a substantial number
of real property kickers (or a lesser number with greater value), it must
be careful to avoid dispositions in any single year which result in more
than 29% of its gross income, unless the property and other similarly
treated assets have been held for the prescribed period.9
As indicated previously, a land purchase leaseback is one method of
achieving yield and growth from the property kicker, as well as insula-
tion from the activities of the borrower-developer. In these situations,
the REIT purchases the real property and leases it back to the original
owner for a term of years. The lease typically provides for a minimum
fixed rental and for a contingent rent based on a percentage of gross rent
or sales of the tenant. This creates some difficulty in valuing the kicker
and would not lend itself to original issue discount treatment. In most
cases, the only way to account for the kicker is to take the contingent rent
into income when the amount is reasonably ascertainable (in the case of
accrual basis trust) or when received (in the case of a cash basis trust) .92
and yet takes 10% of the land, it might not receive 10% of the actual revenue if it selects
the wrong parcel.
90. For example, if the REIT negotiated an option to receive a 10% undivided inter-
est in a rental project, it could provide that its option was not exercisable until the project
was completed, at which time the trust would exercise its option and either sell its interest
or establish an independent contractor to operate the project. Thus, the REIT can argue
that: (a) the option cannot be deemed instant ownership due to the restriction on its ex-
ercise; and that (b) the activities of the borrower should not be attributable to the trust
since it has no control or opportunity to control the borrower's actions during develop-
ment and construction. The same technique can be used in a residential or condominium
project, except that the option would not be exercisable until the construction lender was
repaid and controls would have to be established on the sales proceeds. Obviously, if
there is serious concern regarding what position the Service might take, the safest ap-
proach would be to seek a private ruling.
91. In order to avoid the holding for sale problems, the trust must be careful of the
manner in which it disposes of the property (marketing, sales promotion, bulk sales versus
individual parcels), as well as the volume of sales. In the Prospectus of the Institutional
Investors Trust, dated July 20, 1972, it was indicated the Service had ruled that the mere
existence of a repurchase option in a land purchase leaseback transaction would not cause
the trust to be considered as holding the investment primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course if its business during the period that the option was unexercisable; but the
Service did not rule on the status of the trust during the period that the option was ex-
ercisable.
92. A discussion of the various types of sale-leasebacks and their business and legal
considerations is beyond the scope of this article. There are some excellent discussions on
'the topic in Hershman, Usury and the "New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 315 (1969); Gunning & Roegge, Contemporary Real Estate Financ-
ing Techniques, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J., 325 (1968); Oppenheimer, REITs Seek-
ing Equity Kickers Travel a Perilous Sea, 1 (Part 4) REAL ESTATE REV. 31, 36 (Winter
1972); P.L.I. SALE AND LEASFBACK FNANCnG, No. 6 (1969).
EQUITY PARTICIPATIONS
D. Partnership Interests
The Service has, in published and private rulings, as well as in its
regulations, sanctioned a REIT's participation as a general or limited
partner. 3 The trust shall be deemed to own its proportionate share of the
partnership assets and entitled to the income attributable to same. Such
interest is determined in accordance with the trust's capital interest in
the partnership. The character of the assets and income of the partner-
ship is retained in the hands of the trust for all purposes of section 856.
Where the partnership sells real property or the trust sells its interest in
the partnership, any gross income from that sale attributable to the real
property shall be deemed gross income from the sale or disposition of
real property for the shorter of either the period that the partnership held
the property or the period the trust was a partner.94 These same rules are
applied to limited partnership interestsY5
Thus, if the partnership owns property which, if owned directly by
the trust, would be considered "real estate assets" under section 856(c)-
(6) (B), the trust interest in the partnership will be deemed to be an
interest in "real estate assets" as used in section 856(c) (5) (A). Like-
wise, to the extent that the partnership's gross income would qualify as
"rents from real property" or as "interest on obligations secured by a
mortgage on real property or on interests in real property" if earned di-
rectly by the trust, such income will retain that same character when
received by the REIT.
The rights and responsibilities of a limited partner, if such be the
interest taken by the REIT, should be carefully explored under the
partnership statutes.96 Other state law considerations are also relevant . 7
The REIT must assure itself, by whatever controls and contractual
provisions are necessary, that the partnership and the partners are re-
stricted in their type of income and assets, as well as activities.9" Even
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6841 (1965), Rev. Rul. 69-40,
1969-1, Cum. BULL. 188; Memorandum from NAREIT to members, April 25, 1972; Zivan,
Won't You Be My Partner? A Complex Question For a Real Estate Investment Trust, 27
THr TAX LAWYER 53 (Fall, 1973).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (1962) as amended by T.D. 6841 (1965). This holding
period can be important for purposes of compliance with the 30% income test of INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(4). See Accounting Principles Board Opinion 18 for a REIT ac-
counting for its interest in a partnership.
95. Rev. Rul. 69-40, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 188.
96. For example, under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partner dealing
with the partnership is subject to certain restrictions including in effect a preclusion from
receiving collateral security. UNIFORm LIimED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13. Also, substantial
control over- the partnership activities, which a REIT would be inclined to demand to
avoid disqualification, might jeopardize its limited partnership status.
97. In Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971), the
court cancelled a partnership agreement between a borrower and lender and held that a
loan by the lender at the maximum rate plus a kicker of 25% of the profits of the partner-
ship was usurious. In so holding, the court found that the partnership interest of the lender
(obtained for $25) was clearly a "thing of value" under the North Carolina interest statute.
See Hershman, Usury and the Tight Money Market, 24 Bus. LAW. 1121 (1969).
98. Another potential problem relating to attribution of ownership under INT. REV.
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with all the appropriate controls and restrictions on the partnership, the
general partner may, inadvertently or intentionally, breach its agreement,
leaving the trust disqualified, although admittedly with the right to
damages."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The negotiation and structuring of equity kickers represent an area
of potential exposure of the REIT far greater, in many respects, than the
more formalistic requirements of the Code. What must be blended in
each case where an equity kicker is involved are the economic desires of
the trust and the realistic exposure under the Code, regulations and
rulings pertaining to its operations.
CODE OF 1954, § 318 and the tainting of income or disqualification of the trust was raised
by NAREIT memoranda dated April 25, 1972 and May 5, 1972. The Service has since
modified its position and has published a ruling which will allow a trust to become a
partner under the facts outlined in the April 25, 1972, memorandum. See Rev. Rul. 73-194,
1973 INT. REv. BULL. 17, at 26, which holds that rental income is not disqualified under
section 856(d)(3) where a REIT has as its partner a corporation which is a sister sub-
sidiary to a management company.
99. For example, if a REIT were a general partner in a limited partnership and
owned more than a 10% capital interest in the partnership and the partnership was found
to be an association taxable as a corporation, it would probably follow that the REIT
owned more than 10% of the voting stock of an issuer.
